Bilateral negotiation facilitates stable coexistence of cooperation with defection in Prisoner's Dilemma game

Yimei Yang, Hao Sun, Guangjing Yang and Yanru Sun

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2024, vol. 471, issue C

Abstract: We explore the effect of bilateral negotiation, a common means to resolve conflicts, on the stable coexistence of cooperation with defection, a phenomenon that occurs frequently in nature and human society but lacks a scientific explanation so far. To model how individuals negotiate, we define two negotiable strategies: the negotiable cooperation strategy and the negotiable defection strategy. By investigating the replicator dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game with these negotiable strategies in infinite populations, cooperators and defectors may coexist stably only in a bilaterally-negotiating Prisoner's Dilemma game that includes all negotiable strategies. Moreover, we define the defection temptation as individuals' willingness to gamble for higher payoffs in a game and show that bilateral negotiation can diminish the defection temptation. Importantly, the bilaterally-negotiating Prisoner's Dilemma game's defection temptation being positive is the necessary and sufficient condition for stable coexistence, implying that bilateral negotiation can help cooperators coexist with defectors even when defection is tempting in the current game. In the stable coexistence equilibrium, the frequency of negotiable cooperators increases with their relative negotiation ability.

Keywords: Cooperation; Bilateral negotiation; Prisoner's dilemma game; Replicator dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300324000638
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:471:y:2024:i:c:s0096300324000638

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.128591

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos

More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().