An evolutionary game with reputation-based imitation-mutation dynamics

Kehuan Feng, Songlin Han, Minyu Feng and Attila Szolnoki

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2024, vol. 472, issue C

Abstract: Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational choices in strategy updates. We now fill this gap and explore the consequence of such kind of randomness, or one may interpret it as an autonomous thinking. In particular, we study how this extended dynamics alters the evolution of cooperation when individual reputation is directly linked to collected payoff, hence providing a general fitness function. For a broadly valid conclusion, our spatial populations cover different types of interaction topologies, including lattices, small-world and scale-free graphs. By means of intensive simulations we can detect substantial increase in cooperation level that shows a reasonable stability in the presence of a notable strategy mutation.

Keywords: Prisoner's dilemma; Complex networks; Reputation mechanism; Evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:472:y:2024:i:c:s0096300324000900

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.128618

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