The emergence of cooperation in the context of prior agreement with threshold and posterior compensation

Jianwei Wang, Wei Chen, Fengyuan Yu, Siyuan Zhou, Jialu He, Wenshu Xu and Wenhui Dai

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2024, vol. 474, issue C

Abstract: Previous experience suggests that prior agreement (a mechanism to test how strongly peers are committed to a common goal) and posterior compensation (a way to compensate cooperators by punishing defectors who violate their commitments) together contribute to the flourishing of cooperation. Far less is known, however, how the determination of the optimal threshold for prior agreement in force and the posterior compensation affect collaboration, and the relevance of different strategies. Here, in the context of public goods games and using an evolutionary game theory model, we investigate the evolution of cooperation and the relevance of different strategies by introducing prior agreements and posterior compensation in structured populations. Analytical results show that posterior compensation does not always promote cooperation and that there are sudden increases and decreases in the first-order phase transition. Interestingly, prior agreements without posterior compensation can also effectively restrain defectors, with cooperation abundance remaining at a high level. Furthermore, the threshold of effective agreement has nonlinear effects on cooperation, with cooperation abundance peaking at intermediate thresholds under specific parameters.

Keywords: Prior agreements; Threshold; Evolutionary game; Posterior compensation; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:474:y:2024:i:c:s0096300324001449

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.128672

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