Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making?

Jarrad Harford (), Ambrus Kecskés and Sattar Mansi

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018, vol. 50, issue C, 424-452

Abstract: We study the effect of investor horizons on a comprehensive set of corporate decisions. We argue that monitoring by long-term investors generates decision making that maximizes shareholder value. We find that long-term investors strengthen governance and restrain managerial misbehaviors such as earnings management and financial fraud. They discourage a range of investment and financing activities but encourage payouts. Innovation increases, in quantity and quality. Shareholders benefit through higher profitability that the stock market does not fully anticipate, and lower risk.

Keywords: Agency problems; Monitoring; Managerial myopia; Investor horizons; Corporate governance; Managerial misbehavior; Investment; Innovation; Financing; Off balance sheet debt; Debt maturity; Payouts; Valuation; Profitability; Volatility; Credit events (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G31 G32 G34 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (83)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:50:y:2018:i:c:p:424-452

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.022

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