Internal coalition and stock price crash risk

Lin Xu, Yulei Rao, Yingmei Cheng and Jianxin Wang

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2020, vol. 64, issue C

Abstract: We examine the impact of internal coalition, measured by the appointment of the top executives and directors by the CEO after he assumes office, on stock crash risk during 2000–2014. The appointment-based internal coalition has a positive and significant impact on stock crash risk. Internal coalition is a more important factor than measures of CEO power, such as CEO tenure and duality, in predicting stock price crash. We address the endogeneity concerns by utilizing an exogenous shock to the internal coalition to conduct difference-in-differences (DID) regressions. The main results survive numerous robustness tests.

Keywords: Stock crash risk; Corporate governance; Internal coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119920300845
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:64:y:2020:i:c:s0929119920300845

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101640

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Corporate Finance is currently edited by A. Poulsen and J. Netter

More articles in Journal of Corporate Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().