 The importance of target information in the acquisition of privately held firmsPaul Mason and Mike Stegemoller Journal of Corporate Finance, 2022, vol. 77, issue C Abstract: Privately held companies make-up the vast majority of targets in corporate takeovers. When disclosure is not required, acquiring firms usually provide little to no information about either the deal or the target in these transactions. The absence of such information may be innocuous if investors believe it to be unimportant. We examine whether investors respond to basic information disclosed by acquirers of private targets. Our evidence suggests investors respond to the disclosure of deal value whereas sales information of the target is unimportant compared to transactions where such information is not disclosed. Our results are robust to using a matched sample of deals with and without the disclosure of deal value and sales information. Using a subset of hand-collected data, our study also provides insight into the method and timing by which acquirers disclose information about private targets. Altogether, our evidence suggests regulatory policies surrounding seemingly insignificant, private acquisitions should consider the disclosure of deal value to be important to investors. Keywords: Private acquisitions; Disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:77:y:2022:i:c:s0929119922001523 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102309 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Corporate Finance is currently edited by A. Poulsen and J. Netter More articles in Journal of Corporate Finance from Elsevier |
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