Shades of grey: Risk-related agency conflicts and corporate innovation

Emdad Islam and Lubna Rahman

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2023, vol. 83, issue C

Abstract: We investigate how risk-related agency conflicts affect valuable risky investments. Using an exogenous negative shock to shareholders' litigation rights from an unanticipated court ruling that exacerbates risk-related agency conflicts by shielding managers from shareholders' governance through litigation, we show that innovation inputs and quality decline significantly for treated firms. Small firms lacking counteracting governance mechanisms, such as institutional investors, suffer significantly, while large firms with high institutional investments emerge unscathed. Our results are consistent with theories that predict managerial incentives for ‘playing safe’ lead to value-destroying and risk-reducing actions, especially when counteracting incentive mechanisms are muted.

Keywords: Risk-related agency conflicts; Innovation; R&D; Shareholders' governance; Litigation rights; Institutional investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G32 G34 J33 K22 K41 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:83:y:2023:i:c:s0929119923001244

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102475

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