The impact of pay-for-percentile incentive on low-achieving students in rural China
Fang Chang,
Huan Wang,
Yaqiong Qu,
Qiang Zheng,
Prashant Loyalka,
Sean Sylvia,
Yaojiang Shi,
Sarah-Eve Dill and
Scott Rozelle
Economics of Education Review, 2020, vol. 75, issue C
Abstract:
In some accountability regimes, teachers pay more attention to higher achieving students at the expense of lower achieving students. The overall goal of this study is to examine, in this type of accountability regime, the impacts of a pay-for-percentile type scheme in which incentives exist for all students but which are larger for improving the achievement of lower achieving students. Analyzing data from a large-scale randomized experiment in rural China, we find that incentives improve average achievement by 0.10 SDs and the achievement of low-achieving students by 0.15 SDs. We find parallel changes in teacher behavior and curricular coverage. Taken together, the results demonstrate that incentive schemes can effectively address teacher neglect of low-achieving students.
Keywords: Pay-for-percentile incentive; Student achievement; Low-achieving students; RCTs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I24 J33 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:75:y:2020:i:c:s0272775719300676
DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2020.101954
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