Agility in repeated games: An example

Ran Spiegler ()

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 131, issue C, 47-49

Abstract: I study a repeated matching-pennies game between players having limited “agility”: when player i decides to switch his action, it takes (geometrically distributed) time for the decision to be implemented. I characterize the unique Nash equilibrium in this game when the papers are sufficiently agile. Players obtain the same equilibrium payoff as in the benchmark game with unlimited agility. However, equilibrium behavior displays endogenous hysteresis, which is more pronounced for less agile players.

Keywords: Guerilla; Repeated games; Imperfect monitoring; Agility; Organizational behavior; Hysteresis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:131:y:2015:i:c:p:47-49

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.026

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