Does monitoring deter future cheating? The case of external examiners in Italian schools

Marco Bertoni, Giorgio Brunello, Marco Alberto De Benedetto and Maria De Paola ()

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 201, issue C

Abstract: We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to schools in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that persistence is short lived.

Keywords: Education; Testing; External monitoring; Short-run effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:201:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521000197

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109742

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