Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts

Pablo Amoros

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 207, issue C

Abstract: A group of n≥2 experts has to pick one winner from a group of m≥2 candidates. Different experts may have different judgments about who the best candidate is. A social choice rule (SCR) is q-supermajoritarian (with q≥n2+1) if, whenever a candidate is judged as best by at least q experts, that candidate is considered to be the deserving winner. Experts may be biased and their preferences are not necessarily aligned with their judgments. Then, the social planner has to design a mechanism that implements the SCR. We show that implementability of a q-supermajoritarian SCR in an ordinal equilibrium concept requires the group of experts to satisfy a condition of impartiality that depends on q (the higher q, the weaker the condition).

Keywords: Mechanism design; Supermajority rules; Aggregation of experts’ judgments; Impartial experts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:207:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521002901

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110013

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