Details about Pablo Amoros

Access statistics for papers by Pablo Amoros.

Last updated 2012-05-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pam9

Working Papers

2010

1. A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
   Working Papers, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center
   See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2011)
2. Deciding Whether a Law is Constitutional, Interpretable, or Unconstitutional
   Working Papers, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center
   See also Journal Article in SERIEs (2012)
3. Picking the Winners
   Working Papers, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center
   Also in Working Papers, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center (2009)

2008

4. Indicators of Electoral Victory
   Working Papers, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center
   See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2010)
5. Unequivocal Majority and Maskin-Monotonicity
   Working Papers, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2009)

2007

6. Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?
   CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) View citations (3)

2006

7. Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors
   Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2009)

2004

8. A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation
   Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces

2003

9. Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation
   Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces
   See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2004)

1998

10. - IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIMAL CONTRACTS UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION
    Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)
11. - SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES WITH SEVERAL COMMODITIES
    Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2002)

Undated

12. The scholarship assignment problem
    Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2002)

Journal Articles

2012

1. Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional
   SERIEs, 2012, 3, (1), 1-14
   See also Working Paper (2010)

2011

2. A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
   Economics Letters, 2011, 110, (3), 241-244
   See also Working Paper (2010)

2010

3. Indicators of electoral victory
   Public Choice, 2010, 144, (1), 239-251
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2009

4. Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (3), 1211-1226
   See also Working Paper (2006)
5. Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 33, (4), 521-532
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2006

6. Bargaining and waning commitments
   Economics Letters, 2006, 92, (3), 417-422

2004

7. Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 49, (2), 424-434 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper (2003)

2002

8. Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, 19, (1), 57-67
   See also Working Paper (1998)
9. The Scholarship Assignment Problem
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 38, (1), 1-18 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper

2001

10. original papers: Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
    Review of Economic Design, 2001, 6, (1), 41-61

1999

11. Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities
    Economics Letters, 1999, 63, (3), 341-349