Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas

Riccardo Ghidoni, Blair L. Cleave and Sigrid Suetens

European Economic Review, 2019, vol. 116, issue C, 148-159

Abstract: This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner’s dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner’s dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high.

Keywords: Cooperation; Contagion; Matching protocol; Laboratory experiment; Meta-study (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:116:y:2019:i:c:p:148-159

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002

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