Campaign contests

Philipp Denter

European Economic Review, 2020, vol. 127, issue C

Abstract: I develop a formal model of political campaigns in which candidates choose how to distribute their resources over two different policy issues. I assume that campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous effects, both rooted in social and cognitive psychology: It increases the perceived quality of the advertising candidate in that issue (persuasion) and it makes the issue more salient (priming), thereby increasing the issue’s perceived importance to the voters. I show that, unlike in the extant literature, interior pure strategy equilibria, in which every candidate campaigns on all issues, exist, if persuasion is sufficiently effective. However, candidates “specialize” by spending more than their contender on the issue, in which they hold a comparative advantage. Further, I show that an issue receives more aggregate spending, if it becomes more important or if voters’ opinions on candidates’ qualities in the issue become weaker. A candidate increases his vote share during the campaign contest, if he has a comparative advantage on the issue that receives more aggregate spending. The contest may therefore be biased in one candidate’s favor and an a priori less popular candidate might be the actual odds on favorite.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Campaign spending; Contests; Priming; Advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:127:y:2020:i:c:s001429212030091x

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103459

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