A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation

Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa and Ngo Long
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Luca Colombo and Luca Colombo

European Economic Review, 2022, vol. 143, issue C

Abstract: We study the dynamics of equilibrium participation in an international environmental agreement aimed at increasing the stock of a global public good such as climate change mitigation. In contrast with previous studies, we assume partial cooperation among signatories and show that the coalition size can be large and increase over time, even when the initial coalition size is small. We highlight a novel trade-off between agreements that are narrow-but-deep-and-long-lived and those that are broad-but-shallow-and-short-lived. Our results show that loose cooperative agreements, which are broad-but-shallow-and-short-lived, are both welfare- and Pareto-superior to tight cooperative agreements, which are narrow-but-deep-and-long-lived. We also show that conditions exist under which the equilibrium coalition size is efficient.

Keywords: Differential games; Climate change mitigation; Stable coalitions; Coefficient of cooperation; Social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D60 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:143:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000058

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104036

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