The political economy of lighthouses in antebellum America

Justin T Callais and Vincent Geloso

European Economic Review, 2023, vol. 154, issue C

Abstract: The study of the lighthouse features prominently in debates over the private provision of public services. However, little attention has been devoted to how lighthouse systems operated once governments took charge of its production. We exploit the fact that Antebellum America came close to the ideal textbook solution to providing public goods and we assess how the government allocated lighthouses before the Civil War. We find some evidence that the lighthouses were built according to commercial needs. However, we discover stronger evidence that political considerations played a role in selecting where lighthouses would be built.

Keywords: Lighthouse; Public goods; American economic history; Public interest; Public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 L51 N31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000545

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104425

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