The unbundling of journalism

Michele Bisceglia

European Economic Review, 2023, vol. 158, issue C

Abstract: Due to the switching behavior of online consumers, news outlets increasingly compete with each other to attract audience for each single news item they produce, rather than for complete editions of their newspapers: the so called unbundling of journalism. Using a standard Hotelling model, I show that online competition unambiguously reduces news articles’ quality, as compared to the scenario in which outlets compete to sell their newspapers (content bundles) to single-homing consumers. The unbundling of journalism also dampens outlets’ newsgathering activities when their ideological positions are relatively unimportant from consumers’ viewpoint. In this case, consumers are worse off in the online market for news, even though they consume more articles and have low disutility from switching.

Keywords: Online news; Unbundling; News quality; Newsgathering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:158:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123001617

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104532

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