Overreaction and the value of information in a pandemic
Keyvan Eslami and
Hyunju Lee
European Economic Review, 2024, vol. 161, issue C
Abstract:
This paper studies optimal mitigation and testing during a pandemic in the presence of partial information. We develop a stylized dynamic epidemiological model where the true number of infected individuals can only be partially inferred from two noisy signals: hospitalization and positivity rate. An egalitarian planner chooses the level of mitigation and testing, which respectively affect the infection rate and signal noise, at a certain economic cost. We first show that the planner is willing to pay a significant “information premium” to eliminate the uncertainty by extensive testing. However, if testing is prohibitively costly, then a stringent mitigation becomes optimal, as it partially substitutes for testing as an information acquisition device. Such policies were often criticized as excessive at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that this “optimal overreaction” is a result of the extreme costs of policy mistakes – such as high future casualties – and not due to an aversion to risk.
Keywords: Mitigation; Testing; Partial information; Bayesian updating; Particle filtering; COVID-19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E65 H12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:161:y:2024:i:c:s0014292123002520
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104624
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