 Motivated information acquisition and social norm formationEugen Dimant, Fabio Galeotti and Marie Claire Villeval European Economic Review, 2024, vol. 167, issue C Abstract: We investigate how individuals select sources of information about peers’ behavior and normative views, and the influence of this social information on individual behavior and both empirical and normative expectations. This is explored through two experiments (N=1,945; N=2,414) using a lying game, with and without known political identification. Our findings reveal a self-serving bias in the selection of information sources, with a preference for lenient sources (i.e., those presenting more tolerant empirical or normative information about lying), particularly when these sources align with an individual’s political identity. We observe that being exposed to information that suggests lying is more socially acceptable increases lying behavior. Additionally, while people’s normative expectations are not swayed by observing their peers’ actions, these expectations are influenced by information about what peers believe is the right thing to do, underscoring the role of normative information in shaping social norms. Keywords: Social norms; Information acquisition; Peer effects; Group identity; Lying (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:167:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124001077 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104778 Access Statistics for this article European Economic Review is currently edited by T.S. Eicher, A. Imrohoroglu, E. Leeper, J. Oechssler and M. Pesendorfer More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier |
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