The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default

Christoph Trebesch and Michael Zabel

European Economic Review, 2017, vol. 92, issue C, 416-432

Abstract: How costly are sovereign debt crises? In this paper we study output losses during sovereign default and debt renegotiation episodes since 1980. In contrast to previous work, we account for the severity of default and not only for its occurrence. Specifically, we distinguish between “hard” and “soft” defaults, using new data on debtor payment and negotiation behavior and on the size of haircuts towards private external creditors. We show that hard defaults are associated with a much steeper drop in GDP, of up to ten percent, compared to soft defaults. The results are consistent with theoretical models assuming proportional output costs of default.

Keywords: Sovereign debt crises; Debt restructuring; Economic growth; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F41 G01 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default (2017)
Working Paper: The Output Costs of Hard and Soft Sovereign Default (2016)
Working Paper: The Output Costs of Hard and Soft Sovereign Default (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:92:y:2017:i:c:p:416-432

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.10.004

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