Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

Peter Buisseret

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 494-506

Abstract: I study electoral competition between established parties under threat of entry by a challenger under non-majoritarian run-off elections. In contrast with classical majoritarian run-off elections, I show how non-majoritarian rules can facilitate two-party systems, including those in which the established parties deter the challenger's entry by adopting differentiated platforms. I also show that non-majoritarian run-off rules may facilitate entry deterrence by established parties in settings where a plurality rule cannot. My results provide a striking counterpoint to a conventional wisdom—embodied, most notably, in Duverger's Hypothesis—that associates run-off rules with multi-party systems. Finally, they provide a theoretical foundation for patterns of electoral competition observed in countries using non-majoritarian rules that contradict this conventional wisdom.

Keywords: Run-off; Electoral competition; Entry deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:494-506

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007

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