Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto and Eve Ramaekers

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 613-631

Abstract: We consider implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. We provide a complete characterization of the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable when agents are partially honest, in the sense that they have strict preferences for being sincere when truthfulness does not result in a worse outcome. As an application, we show that the Pareto correspondence is implemented by a finite mechanism.

Keywords: Implementation in undominated strategies; Partial honesty; Bounded mechanism; Pareto correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:613-631

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.014

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