Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result

Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 106, issue C, 317-328

Abstract: We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening techniques are not applicable. Moreover, we identify the counterparts of well-understood features of the static screening model in the corresponding sequential screening model such as the single-crossing condition and conditions that imply the optimality of deterministic schedules.

Keywords: Sequential screening; Static screening; Stochastic mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Sequential versus Static Screening: an Equivalence Result (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:317-328

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.015

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