How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

Tore Ellingsen, Robert Östling and Erik Wengström

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 107, issue C, 153-181

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Pre-play communication; Noncooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:153-181

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.004

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