Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

Giacomo Bonanno () and Elias Tsakas

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 112, issue C, 231-241

Abstract: We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Börgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS.

Keywords: Ordinal payoffs; Rationality; Common belief; Dominance; Iterated deletion procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:112:y:2018:i:c:p:231-241

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003

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