Promises, expectations & causation

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 113, issue C, 137-146

Abstract: Why do people keep their promises? Vanberg (2008) and Ederer and Stremitzer (2017) provide causal evidence in favor of, respectively, an intrinsic preference for keeping one's word and Charness and Dufwenberg's (2006) expectations-based account based on guilt aversion. The overall picture is incomplete though, as no study disentangles effects in a design that provides exogenous variation of both (the key features of) promises and beliefs. We report evidence from an experimental design that does so.

Keywords: Promises; Expectations; Guilt aversion; Moral commitment; Causation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618301246
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Promises, Expectations & Causation (2018)
Working Paper: Promises, Expectations & Causation (2018)
Working Paper: Promises, expectations & causation (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:137-146

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.009

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().