Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation

Nicole Tabasso

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 219-240

Abstract: We introduce two pieces of information (memes) into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when agents meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at each meeting, which one depends on preferences over memes. We find that the conditions under which a unique meme becomes endemic are sufficient for both to become endemic. Segregation according to information preferences leads to polarization, i.e., nobody is informed of both memes, and a loss of information. We show how the likelihood of segregation depends on information preferences and on parameters of the diffusion process.

Keywords: Social networks; Information transmission; Multiple states; Segregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Diffusion of Multiple Information: On Information Resilience and the Power of Segregation (2015)
Working Paper: Diffusion of Multiple Information: On Information Resilience and the Power of Segregation (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:219-240

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.003

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