Should straw polls be banned?

S. Nageeb Ali and Aislinn Bohren

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 118, issue C, 284-294

Abstract: A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or “deliberating” before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal uses a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose the equilibrium played by the committee, or use a non-anonymous or non-monotone voting rule.

Keywords: Information aggregation; Committees; Deliberation; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Should Straw Polls be Banned? (2018)
Working Paper: Should Straw Polls be Banned? (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:284-294

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.006

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