Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Ludovic Julien ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 122, issue C, 318-327

Abstract: We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we show that, when atoms have Leontievian utility functions, any Cournot-Nash allocation is a Walras allocation and, consequently, it is Pareto optimal.

Keywords: Cournot-Nash equilibrium; Walras equilibrium; Leontievian preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:122:y:2020:i:c:p:318-327

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.004

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