Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium

Akira Okada

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 128, issue C, 193-201

Abstract: We consider a non-cooperative decentralized matching game as sequential bargaining. A protocol-free equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium which is robust to a choice of a bargaining protocol. We show that a matching is generated in a protocol-free equilibrium if and only if it is stable. The bargaining game can be applied to a wide class of matching problems including marriage problems, college admissions problems, matching with contracts, assignment games, and cooperative NTU games.

Keywords: Decentralized market; Many-to-one matching; Protocol-free equilibrium; Sequential bargaining; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:128:y:2021:i:c:p:193-201

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.006

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