Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem

Daisuke Hirata, Yusuke Kasuya and Kentaro Tomoeda

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 130, issue C, 474-498

Abstract: We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the “robustness” of deviations (i.e., blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching robust up to depth k, if none of the deviators gets worse off than at the original matching after any sequence of at most k subsequent deviations. We say that a matching is stable against robust deviations (for short, SaRD) up to depth k, if no deviation from it is robust up to depth k. As a smaller k imposes a stronger requirement for a matching to be SaRD, we investigate the existence of a matching that is SaRD with a minimal depth k. We constructively demonstrate that a SaRD matching always exists for k=3 and establish sufficient conditions for k=1 and 2.

Keywords: Matching; Roommate problem; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem (2020)
Working Paper: Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem (2019)
Working Paper: Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:474-498

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.012

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