General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis

Rafael M. Frongillo and Ian A. Kash

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 130, issue C, 636-662

Abstract: We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms, scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not qualify as one or the other. Our main result is a characterization theorem, yielding characterizations for all of these settings. This includes a new characterization of scoring rules for non-convex sets of distributions. We combine the characterization theorem with duality to give a simple construction to convert between scoring rules and randomized mechanisms. We also show how a generalization of this characterization gives a new proof of a mechanism design result due to Saks and Yu.

Keywords: Information elicitation; Mechanism design; Proper scoring rules; Implementability characterizations; Property elicitation; Convex analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:636-662

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.010

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