Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing

Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng and Christos Tzamos

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 134, issue C, 104-116

Abstract: Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different randomized bundles to the buyer. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between optimal mechanisms and simple mechanisms are unbounded.

Keywords: Revenue maximization; Lotteries; Simple mechanisms; Menu-size complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:134:y:2022:i:c:p:104-116

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.003

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