Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results

Rasoul Ramezanian and Mehdi Feizi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 135, issue C, 356-367

Abstract: A random assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for any of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that strategy-proof and ordinal efficient mechanisms satisfy neither equal treatment of equals nor equal division lower bound. We prove that it is not possible to avoid these two impossibilities by weakening ordinal efficiency to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency.

Keywords: Random assignment problem; Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency; Equal treatment of equals; Equal division lower bound (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:356-367

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.010

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