Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?

Viola Ackfeld and Werner Güth

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 140, issue C, 1-32

Abstract: Personal information is shared extensively every day, particularly when competing for others' attention on online platforms. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the interaction of peer comparison and incentives as drivers to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report feeling more compelled to reveal information. Our results shed light on additional drivers for the current information-sharing trend, while pointing to neglected social pressure to disclose personal information in competitive environments.

Keywords: Personal information disclosure; Incentives; Social pressure; Privacy; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:1-32

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.004

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