Leadership ability and agenda choice

Ilwoo Hwang and Stefan Krasa

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 179-192

Abstract: Should a political leader first focus on smaller policy goals or start with the most ambitious policy agenda? We model a political leader who chooses the policy agenda and proposes policies to a responder. The leader has a high or low ability to persuade the responder to agree to a proposal, and both parties are symmetrically uninformed about this ability. If the belief about the leader's ability is low, then it is optimal to start with the ambitious policy, but the reverse is true if the belief is high. Addressing both policies together is dominated by a sequential approach.

Keywords: Agenda choice; Leadership; Bargaining; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D72 D74 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:179-192

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.016

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