 Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problemsYoichi Kasajima and Manabu Toda Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 143, issue C, 269-286 Abstract: We propose a new axiom called “own-side singles monotonicity” in one-to-one matching problems between men and women. Suppose that there is an agent who is not matched in a problem. Suppose for simplicity it is a woman. Now in a new problem, we improve (or leave unchanged) her ranking for each man. Own-side singles monotonicity requires that each woman should not be made better off (except for her). If we focus on improving the ranking of an unmatched woman, then the men-optimal stable solution satisfies this property. By contrast, (if the gender of an unmatched agent is not specified), no single-valued solution satisfies own-side singles monotonicity and stability. However, there is a multi-valued solution, the stable solution, that does. We show that the stable solution is the unique solution satisfying weak unanimity, null agent invariance, own-side singles monotonicity, and consistency, where consistency can be replaced by Maskin invariance. Keywords: One-to-one matching; Own-side singles monotonicity; Other-side singles monotonicity; Stability; Consistency; Maskin invariance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:269-286 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.001 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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