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Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets

Di Feng, Bettina Klaus (bettina.klaus@unil.ch) and Flip Klijn

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 146, issue C, 234-254

Abstract: We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top-trading-cycles (tTTC) mechanism.

Keywords: Multiple-type housing markets; Strategy-proofness; Non-bossiness; Self-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofness; Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism; Market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets (2022) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:146:y:2024:i:c:p:234-254

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010

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