Capacity design in school choice

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Umut Dur and Martin Van der Linden

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 146, issue C, 277-291

Abstract: We study a new variant of the school choice problem in which capacities can be altered by distributing additional seats across schools in response to students' reported preferences. We show that heuristic solutions to this capacity design problem can be inefficient, even if they focus on allocating seats to the most demanded schools. We introduce a simple class of algorithms that, in the problem where additional seats can be distributed, characterizes the set of efficient matchings among those that respect priorities. We also investigate the incentive properties of this class of efficient algorithms.

Keywords: School choice; Matching theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:146:y:2024:i:c:p:277-291

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.002

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