Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

Jeffrey Carpenter

Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, vol. 60, issue 1, 31-51

Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods (2004)
Working Paper: Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods (2002)
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