Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)

Pradeep Dubey and Dieter Sondermann

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 65, issue 1, 124-141

Abstract: We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.

Keywords: Limit; orders; Double; auction; Nash; equilibria; Walras; equilibria; Mechanism; design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Perfect Competition in an Oligopoly (Including Bilateral Monopoly) (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:1:p:124-141

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