Farsightedly stable networks

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 67, issue 2, 526-541

Abstract: A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network g[set membership, variant] G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.

Keywords: Networks; Farsighted; players; Stability; Pairwise; deviations; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (125)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(09)00003-7
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Farsightedly stable networks (2009)
Working Paper: Farsightedly stable networks (2006)
Working Paper: Farsightedly stable networks (2006)
Working Paper: Farsightedly stable networks (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:526-541

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().