Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case

Dov Samet

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 1, 169-174

Abstract: A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann's agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge.

Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:169-174

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