The e-mail game phenomenon

Yi-Chun Chen () and Siyang Xiong

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 80, issue C, 147-156

Abstract: The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis — types in finite or common-prior models — display strategic discontinuity in simple games.

JEL-codes: C70 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:147-156

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010

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