Random dictatorship domains

Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen and Huaxia Zeng

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 212-236

Abstract: A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in Aswal et al., 2003) are needed to restore random dictatorship and such strengthenings are “almost necessary”.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Random social choice functions; Random dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Random Dictatorship Domains (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:212-236

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017

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