Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums

Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen and David C. Parkes

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 458-474

Abstract: We provide a game-theoretic model of sequential information aggregation motivated by online question-and-answer forums. An asker posts a question and each user decides when to aggregate a unique piece of information with existing information. When the quality exceeds a certain threshold, the asker closes the question and allocates points to users. We consider the effect of different rules for allocating points on the equilibrium behavior. A best-answer rule provides a unique, efficient equilibrium in which all users respond in the first round, for substitutes valuations over information. However, the best-answer rule isolates the least efficient equilibrium for complements valuations. We demonstrate alternate scoring rules that provide an efficient equilibrium for distinct subclasses of complements valuations, and retain an efficient equilibrium for substitutes valuations. We introduce a reasonable set of axioms, and establish that no rule satisfying these axioms can achieve the efficient outcome in a unique equilibrium for all valuations.

Keywords: Question and answer forums; User generated content; Contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:458-474

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.003

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