Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

Marie Laclau ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 136-160

Abstract: I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any network, a folk theorem holds if some Joint Pairwise Identifiability condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for a folk theorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set of neighbors not counting each other.

Keywords: Communication; Folk theorem; Imperfect private monitoring; Networks; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614000864
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring (2014)
Working Paper: Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:136-160

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().