Asking questions

Nenad Kos

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 642-650

Abstract: We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Limited communication; Welfare maximization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:642-650

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.003

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