Commitment and observability in games

Kyle Bagwell

Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 8, issue 2, 271-280

Abstract: Models of commitment make two assumptions: there is a first mover, and his action is perfectly observed by the subsequent mover. The purpose of this paper is to disentangle these two assumptions, in order to see if a strategic benefit from commitment remains when the first mover's choice is imperfectly observed. The basic finding is that the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first mover's selection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Date: 1995
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Related works:
Working Paper: Commitment and Observability in Games (1992)
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