Experimental design to persuade

Anton Kolotilin

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 90, issue C, 215-226

Abstract: A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender optimally discloses only whether the receiver's utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the sender's and receiver's welfare to be monotonic in information. In particular, the sender's welfare increases with the precision of the sender's information and decreases with the precision of public information.

Keywords: Information disclosure; Persuasion; Stochastic orders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Experimental Design to Persuade (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:215-226

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.006

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